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I. INTRODUCTION
On November 1, 1995, the Ohio 121st General Assembly in House Bill 1031
enacted section 2745.012 of the Ohio Revised Code. This legislation created an
11995 Ohio Laws 43 (H.B. 103).
2 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2745.01 (Anderson 1995) reads as follows:
(A) Except as provided in this section, an employer shall not be liable
to respond in damages at common law or by statute for an intentional
tort that occurs during the course of employment. An employer only
shall be subject to liability to an employee or the dependent survivors
of a deceased employee in a civil action for damages for an employment
intentional tort.
(B) An employer is liable under this section only if an employee or
the dependent survivors of a deceased employee who bring the action
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the employer deliberately
committed all of the elements of an employment intentional tort.
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"employment intentional tort," and attempts to address the long-standing
conflict between the exclusive remedy provision of the Ohio workers'
compensation system, 3 and intentional torts that occur in the course of
(C) In an action brought under this section, both the following apply:
(1) If the defendant employer moves for summary judgment, the
court shall enter judgment for the defendant unless the plaintiff
employee or dependent survivors set forth specific facts supported by
clear and convincing evidence to establish that the employer committed
an employment intentional tort against the employee;
(2) Notwithstanding any law or rule to the contrary, every pleading,
motion, or other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be
signed by at lease one attorney of record in the attorney's individual
name and if the party is not represented by an attorney, that party shall
sign the pleading, motion, or paper. For the purposes of this section,
the signing by the attorney or party constitutes a certification that the
signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of
the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable
inquiry it is well grounded in fact or a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal or existing law; and that it is not
interposed for any improper purpose, including, but not limited to,
harassing or causing unnecessary delay or needless increase in the
cost of the action.
If the pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed as required in
division (C)(2) of this section, the court shall strike the pleading, motion,
or other paper unless the attorney or party promptly signs it after the
omission is called to the attorney's or party's attention. If a pleading,
motion, or other paper is signed in violation of division (C)(2) of this
section, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose
upon the person who signed it, or the represented party, or both, an
appropriate sanction. The sanction may include, but is not limited to,
an order to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred due to the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper,
including reasonable attorney's fees.
(D) As used in this section:
(1) "Employment intentional tort" means an act committed by an
employer in which the employer deliberately and intentionally injures,
causes an occupational disease of, or causes the death of an employee.
(2) "Employer" means any person who employs an individual.
(3) "Employee" means any individual employed by an employer.
(4) "Employ" means to permit or suffer to work.
30HIO CONST. art. II, § 35 (West 1995).
For the purpose of providing compensation to workmen and their
dependents, for death, injuries or occupational disease, occasioned in
the course of such workmen's employment, laws may be passed
establishing a state fund to be created by compulsory contribution
thereto by employers, and administered by the state, determining the
terms and conditions upon which payment shall be made therefrom.
Such compensation shall be in lieu of all other rights to compensation,
or damages, for such death, injuries, or occupational disease, and any
employer who pays the premium or compensation provided by law,
passed in accordance herewith, shall not be liable to respond in damages
at common law or by statute for such death, injuries or occupational
disease.
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employment. Though this legislation was needed, the statute, as written,
contains overly broad definitions, an ambiguous scope, and controversial
provisions.
The Ohio General Assembly declared its intent to supersede the effects of
several recent Ohio Supreme Court decisions 4 and to establish a statutory
definition, different from common law, of an intentional tort in the workplace.
To understand the legislature's actions, it is imperative to trace the
development and the policies behind the Ohio's workers' compensation
system, and to realize the impact those Ohio Supreme Court's decisions had
on both employers and employees in the State of Ohio. Only when these factors
are considered, the basis for understanding the legislation can occur.
This note will begin with a review of the history of workers' compensation
in Ohio, including the development of the exclusive remedy provision.5 Next,
this note will discuss the types of injuries normally compensated by the Ohio
Workers' Compensation Act [hereinafter OWCA or Act], followed by an
analysis of the Ohio Supreme Court cases and legislation creating an
intentional tort exception in Ohio.6 Finally, this note will critique newly enacted
Revised Code section 2745.01, discuss the severe problems associated with an
expansive interpretation of the statute, and suggest that continuing legislative
reform is needed in this area of law.7
Id.
Further, this note will use the term workers' compensation rather than the original
phraseology of workmen's compensation. The Ohio General Assembly effectuated a
change to the former language with S. 545, 11th Gen. Assembly, 2d Sess. (1976).
41995 Ohio Laws 43 (H.B. 103) § 3, eff. 11-1-95 reads:
The General Assembly hereby declares its intent in enacting sections
2305.112 and 2745.01 of the Revised Code to supersede the effect of
the Ohio Supreme Court decisions in Blankenship v. Cincinnati
Milacron Chemicals, Inc. (1982), 69 Ohio St. 2d 608 (decided March 3,
1982); Jones v. VIP Development Co. (1982), 15 Ohio St. 3d 90 (decided
December 31, 1982); Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox (1988), 36 Ohio
St. 3d 100 (decided April 14, 1988); Pariseau v. Wedge Products, Inc.
(1988), 36 Ohio St. 3d 124 (decided April 13, 1988); Hunter v. Shenago
Furnace Co. (1988), 38 Ohio St. 3d 235 (decided August 24, 1988); and
Fyffe v. Jeno's, Inc. (1991), 59 Ohio St. 3d 115 (decided May 1, 1991),
to the extent that the provisions of sections 2305.112 and 2745.01 of
the Revised Code are to completely and solely control all causes of
actions not governed by Section 35 of Article II, Ohio Constitution,
for physical or psychological conditions, or death, brought by em-
ployees or the survivors of deceased employees against employers.
5 See supra notes 29-51 and accompanying text.
6See supra notes 52-137 and accompanying text.
7See supra notes 138-217 and accompanying text.
1996]
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1996
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
II. DEVELOPMENT OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION
Prior to the enactment of workers' compensation statutes, an employee
attempting to recover damages against an employer for work-related injuries
had to bring a common law cause of action. Courts were generally
unsympathetic to those employees because the tort actions inhibited the
development of the industrialized society.8 To recover at common law,
employees not only had to prove that the employer assumed a duty of care
towards them,9 but also had to prove the employer was negligent. 10
Furthermore, employers were permitted to raise three statutory defenses: (1)
contributory negligence; (2) assumption of the risk; and (3) the fellow servant
rule. These defenses, labeled the "unholy trinity,"11 almost always insulated an
employer from liability, even if the employer in its duty failed to protect his
servants. 12 As a result, employees were only recovering damages in
approximately twenty percent of the cases, 13 and were generally left without
a means of compensation and future earning capacity.14 The uncompensated,
injured employees and their dependents, were then forced to rely on
government aid for sustenance. 15 It was this situation that initiated the creation
8 See Comment, Election and Co-Employee Immunity Under Alabama's Workers'
Compensation Act, 31 ALA. L. REV. 2, 3-4 (1979)(stating common law court unreceptive
to injured workers).
9 See W. PAGE KEETON et al., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 80,569 (5th
ed. 1984). An employer's obligations were limited to specific common law duties for the
protection of his servants which were:
(1) the duty to provide a safe place to work; (2) the duty to provide
safe appliances, tools, and equipment for the work; (3) the duty to
give warning of dangers of which the employee might reasonably
be expected to remain in ignorance; (4) the duty to provide a sufficient
number of suitable fellow servants; (5) the duty to promulgate and
enforce rules for the conduct of employees which would make the
work safe.
Id.
10 See Keeton et al., supra note 9, at § 80,572-73; see also Note, Exceptions to the Exclusive
Remedy Requirements of Workers' Compensation Statutes, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1648-53
(1983) [hereinafter cited as Exceptions] (citing Report of the National Commission on
State Workmen's Compensation Laws 34 (1972)); W. Dodd, Administration of Workmen's
Compensation 26 (1936).
11 See generally Dodd, supra note 10, at 4-11; Keeton et al., supra note 9, § 80, 568-72.
12 See Keeton et al., supra note 9, at 859.
13 See Ratliff, The New Workman's Compensation Law, 9 OHIo L. REP. 207, 211 (1912).
14 See Cynthia Snyder Miller, Note, Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chemical Co.:
Workers' Compensation and the Intentional Tort a New Direction for Ohio, 12 CAP. U. L. REV.
287, 288 (1982).
15 Id.
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of an insurance type system between employers and employees to provide
compensation for the injured employees. 16
Several policies were uniformly cited as bearing on the creation and design
of these insurance systems. First, the injured worker should not be the person
to bear the burden of contending with the injuries of industry, and the costs of
those industrial injuries should be allocated to those receiving the benefits of
industry.17 Second, the expenses of employee injuries should be treated as a
cost of doing business to be passed on to the customer.18 Third, the employer
needs to provide an injured worker with a safe working environment 19 and
provide compensation to the employee for medical and financial benefits in a
dignified fashion.20 Finally, a major purpose of worker's compensation statutes
was to compensate an employee for the economic loss that resulted whenever
an employee was injured or if he was killed.21
The hallmark of workers' compensation laws in effectuating those policies
was a system incorporating a quid pro quo. In a typical workers' compensation
act, the employer provides the employee with a guaranteed and speedy
remedy, regardless of fault or nature of the injury,22 and agrees to surrender his
common law "unholy trinity" of defenses. 23 In exchange, the employee agrees
16 F. Lang, Workmen's Compensation Insurance 6-9 (1947). Though a new concept in the
United States, many industrialized societies around the world had provided
compensation to injured employees. The first workers' compensation system was
enacted in Germany in 1883, soon followed by Austria, Norway, Finland, and England.
As of 1910, almost all European countries had some form of workers' compensation,
and the United States was the only industrialized society without a workers
compensation system.
17 See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 80 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter
PROSSER 4th]("'the cost of the product should bear the blood of the workman.! The
human accident losses of modem industry are to be treated as a cost of production, like
the breakage of tools or machinery. The financial burden is lifted from the shoulders of
the employee, and placed upon the employer, who is expected to add it to his costs, and
so transfer it to the customer."). Id. at 530.
18 See Miller, supra note 14, at 289.
19 See Dodd, supra note 10.
20 See IA. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 2 (1982) [hereinafter LARSON
1A].
21See HAROLD F. ADAMS, THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW OF OHIO 1-3
(1930)("The theory upon which [Ohio's] Act is based is that each time an employee is
killed or injured, there is an economic loss which must be made up in some way; that
most of the accidents are attributable tot he inherent risk of employment; that accidents
in industry under modem conditions are inevitable, that the burden of this loss should
be bome by the industry.").
22 See LARSON 1A, supra note 20, at § 1.10.
231d.; see also Donald P. Wiley, Comment, The New Workers' Compensation Law in Ohio:
Senate Bill 307 was No Accident, 3 AKRON L. REv. 491,495-96 (Winter 1987); see also Keeton
et al., supra note 9, at § 80.
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to surrender his common law causes of action against the employer 24-his
right to recover pain and suffering, loss of consortium, punitive damages, 25
and also agrees that workers' compensation would be his exclusive remedy.
In a system of workers' compensation, both the employer and the employee
make the above sacrifices to gain certain advantages. An employee no longer
has to pursue common law remedies in a system traditionally unfavorable to
him; an employer no longer has to subject himself to unpredictable tort
damages;26 both parties receive the benefits from a uniform system of
compensation outside the realm of tort law,27 and avoid the heavy costs of
litigation.28
III. WORKERS' COMPENSATION IN OHIO
The Ohio Workers' Compensation Act was first enacted in 1911 "to create a
state insurance fund for the benefit of injured, and the dependents of killed
employes [sic], and to provide administration of such fund by a state liability
board of awards."29 In its enactment, the Ohio Supreme Court and legislature
furthered the same policies and rationale that were used in other states
throughout the country.30
However, Ohio's original enactment was not an entire solution. Although its
provisions were based on a system of quid pro quo and provided for guaranteed
recovery and limited employer liability, the Act did not provide for compulsory
employer participation.31 In 1912, Article II, section 35, of the Ohio Constitution
was adopted and gave the Ohio General Assembly the power to establish and
regulate a compulsory workers' compensation fund.32 Article II, section 35
became the foundation for the workers' compensation system in Ohio, was
plenary in nature, and would serve as the basis of power for legislative
enactments. For example, the Ohio legislature defined the types of injuries
24 See Raymond G. Fesmier, Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chemicals, Inc.:
Some Fairness for Ohio Workers and Some Uncertainty for Ohio Employers, 15 TOL. L. REV.
403, 406 (1983); see also PROSSER 4th, supra note 17, at § 124, § 2.
25 See Fesmier, supra note 24, at 407.
26 See Exceptions, supra note 10, at 1642.
2 7See Fesmier, supra note 24, at 407.
28 Bohlen, A Problem in the Drafting of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 25 HARV. L. REV.
328, 331-33 (1912).
291911 Ohio Laws 524.
30See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text; see also State ex rel. Munding v.
Industrial Comm'n, 111 N.E. 299 (Ohio 1915)(expressing the theory upon which the
Ohio workers' compensation law is based).
31j. YOUNG, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW OF OHIO, § 1.4 at 8 (2d ed. 1971).
320HIO CONST. art. II, § 35.
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covered, 33 eliminated the common law defenses for non-complying
employers,34 and stated that the provisions of the Act shall be liberally
construed in favor of employees and their dependents. 35
Only two instances existed when an employee could bring a common law
cause of action against an employer outside the confines of the Ohio workers'
compensation system. First, in situations where an employee's injury was the
result of a "willful act" of the employer or his agent, Section 1465-76 of the Ohio
General Code provided an employee the option to pursue either a common
law remedy or workers' compensation.36 Second, an employee's right to
pursue a common law action also remained when the employer violated a
safety statute.37 In all other cases, workers' compensation was to provide the
exclusive remedy for an employee suffering from a workplace injury.38
One of these exceptions, the "willful act" exception, caused much confusion
among the courts. This confusion was the result of the failure of the legislature
to include the definition of "willful act" in the original Section 1465-76. 39 Thus,
in 1914, section 1465-76 was amended to include the definition of "willful act"
as an act done "knowingly and purposefully with the direct object of injuring
another."4 0 In 1924, however, the Ohio legislature eliminated the "willful act"
exception, 4 1 and in 1931, it was replaced by section 4123.74 of the Ohio Revised
Code.42
3 3 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.01(C)(Anderson 1995).
3 4 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.85.
35 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.95.
361913 Ohio Laws 72,84-85; OHIo GEN. CODE ANN. § 1465-76 (Page 1916)(Under the
original statute, an employee had to make an election of remedies that was mutually
exclusive. If the employee lost in court, he was barred from seeking workers'
compensation).
37 OHIO CONST. art II, § 35 (In its original form, § 35 provided: "No right of action
shall be taken away from an employee when the injury, disease, or death arises from
the failure of the employer to comply with any lawful requirement for the protection of
the lives, health and safety of the employees.").
3 8 0Hio GEN. CODE ANN. § 1465-76 (Page 1916).
39 See Gildersleeve v. Newton Steel Co., 142 N.E. 678 (Ohio 1924); see also Cynthia
Cannata Felson, Comment, Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp.: Intentional Tort Actions in
Workers' Compensation Claims - Back to a Common Law Cause of Action, 19 NOR. Ky. L. REV.
545, 550 (1992).
401914 Ohio Laws 193, 194.
4 1See Mobley & Carew Co. v. Lee, 193 N.E. 745 (Ohio 1934)(judiciary stating the
wording of the amendment suggested that General Code § 1465-76 was implicitly
repealed by the 1924 Amendment).
42 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.74 (Anderson 1995)("Employers ... shall not be liable
to respond in damages at common law or by statute for any injury, or occupational
disease, or bodily condition...").
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In essence, the Ohio General Assembly had exercised its power under Article
II, section 35, of the Ohio Constitution 43 and enacted a provision stating that
an employee's only remedy for a workplace injury was through workers'
compensation. 44 And though this provision sometimes produced harsh results
for employees, section 4123.74 was strictly upheld by the courts for several
years. Courts were denying employee recovery at common law in all instances
whether or not the injury was even compensable under workers' compensation law.45
In 1939, the Ohio Supreme Court once again had the opportunity to interpret
the exclusivity provision of Article II, section 35 in Triff v. National Bronze &
Aluminum Foundry Co.4 6 The result was an entirely different interpretation than
in previous years. The Court held that the legislative intent behind the workers'
compensation scheme was to grant common law immunity to employers for
injuries compensable under the workers' compensation system only, and that
common law remedies were not eliminated for non-compensable injuries.47
Thus, the Court created an exception to section 4123.74's exclusive remedy
provision in situations where the employee's injury was outside the scope of
the compensatory scheme of workers' compensation.
Forseeably, this caused extreme reactions among labor organizations and
employers. The Ohio legislative quid pro quo originally established and
bargained for at the foundation of workers' compensation was being curtailed.
The judiciary had given employees a bypass to pursue common law remedies
in situations previously limited to the domain of workers' compensation.
Contrary to the original quid pro quo, employers would now have to respond
in damages at common law.
In 1939, as a response to these extreme reactions, the legislature added
"occupational diseases" as compensable injuries under the Ohio workers'
compensation system, in exchange for the upholding of the exclusive remedy
provision.48 For nearly twenty years following, the legislature adopted no
further legislation, and contrary to the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Triff,
the exclusivity of remedies under the workers' compensation system remained
intact.
In 1959, the legislature amended section 4123.74 and stated that employ-
ers are immune from liability for all injuries "received or contracted by an
43 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
44 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4123.74.
45 See Miller, supra note 14, at 290.
46Triff v. National Bronze & Aluminum Foundry Co., 20 N.E.2d 232 (Ohio
1939)(involving a claim for silicosis, an occupational disease at the time which was not
compensable under workers compensation) superseded Maynard v. Henderson, 445
N.E.2d 727 (Ohio 1982).
471d. at 237.
48118 Ohio Laws 422 (1939); see also Felson, supra note 39, at 551; see also Miller, supra
note 14, at 290-291.
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employee in the course of or arising out of his employment .... "49 In essence,
this legislative amendment re-affirmed that the only remedy for an employee
injured "in the course of or arising out of his employment" was workers'
compensation benefits, and that an injured employee was "barred from suing
at common law ... even if an employer's intentional act caused the employee's
injury."50
Though the exclusive remedy provision of workers' compensation law may
seem extreme and may produce unfavorable results for employees, 5 1 there is
little doubt that the Ohio legislature has established a pattern of control over
the laws in this arena, and does not allow exceptions to the exclusivity rule. For
every Ohio Supreme Court decision that has tried to expand the remedies
available to employees, the legislature has quickly responded by re-defining
the Workers' Compensation Act to balance the competing parties' interests.
IV. COMPENSABLE INJURIES UNDER OHIO WORKERS' COMPENSATION
Workers' compensation is a type of insurance to cover injuries that occur in
the course of or arising out of employment situations. All states have
established their own definition as to what types of injuries are compensable
in light of their own workers' compensation statutes. Some states have stated
that workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy for employees for all types
of injuries whether they are caused by physical or emotional means. 52 Other
49128 Ohio Laws 1334 (1959).
50 See Felson, supra note 39, at 552.
51 See, e.g., Bevis v. Armco Steel Corp., 102 N.E.2d 444 (Ohio 1955). In Bevis, a common
law remedy outside of workers' compensation was denied to an employee who suffered
from silicosis as a result of his employer concealing information about his employee's
occupational disease. The employer did not inform his employee that chest x-rays and
medical examinations revealed the employee had contracted the disease in the course
of his employment. The court upheld the exclusivity of workers' compensation, even
though the employer used deceit and misrepresentation. See e.g., Greenwalt v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 128 N.E.2d 116 (Ohio 1955) ovemiled inpart by Vandemark v.
Southland, 525 N.E.2d 1374 (Ohio 1988). In Greenwalt, the court denied a common law
remedy for an employee who relied upon his employer's offer to file workers'
compensation benefits for him. Id. The employer intentionally did not file the claim, but
paid benefits for two years directly to the employee. After two years, the employer
refused to make anymore payments. Since the statute of limitations had run, the
employee was left with no means of additional compensation. The court held that the
sole remedy was workers' compensation and the employee was responsible for seeing
that his claim was filed properly. See also Miller, supra note 14, at 291.
52 1n Wisconsin, workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy where the employee
sustains an injury. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.03 (West 1985) and at the time of the injury,
both the employer and employee are subject to the provisions of the statute-the
employee is performing service growing out of and incidental to his or her employment
and the injury is not self-inflicted. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.03(1). In Hawaii, compensable
injuries are those personal injuries "either by accident or arising out of and in the course
of the employment or by disease proximately caused by or resulting from the nature of
the employment." HAw. REv. STAT. § 386-3 (1991).
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states have stated that workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy only for
injuries that occur in the course of employment and caused by physical
means. 53 In the latter states, an employee still has common law remedies
outside workers' compensation. By enacting either a limiting or an expansive
definition of injury, the state legislatures can determine the extent of their own
exclusivity provisions.
The Ohio legislature has provided an expansive definition of injury under
OWCA, and has stated that workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy for
an industrial injury, disease or bodily condition.54 The burden of proving that
injury is upon the worker and the OWCA expressly states that the terms of the
Act are to be construed in favor of workers and dependents of deceased
workers.5 5 The current Act allows compensation for workers in cases of injury,
occupational disease, or death, provided the same were not: (1) purposely
self-inflicted or (2) caused by intoxication or the influence of a controlled
substance not prescribed by a physician.5 6
In essence, Ohio law states that workers' compensation is the exclusive
remedy for an employee suffering from a workplace injury, and encompasses
three types of injuries in the workplace "whether caused by external accidental
means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of, and
arising out of, the injured employee's employment."5 7 Courts have applied the
exclusive remedy provision: (1) when employees suffer from physical injury
caused by physical stimuli;58 (2) when employees suffer mental injury caused
by physical stimuli;59 and (3) when employees suffer physical injury caused by
mental stimuli.60 In fact, the only type of injury not recognized in Ohio and
governed by the exclusive remedy provision is for employees who suffer
53 1n Florida, the workers' compensation statute prohibits a compensation award for
"a mental or nervous injury due to fright or excitement only." FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 440.02(1)(West 1987).
5 4 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.74 (Anderson 1995).
5 5 0Hio REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.95 (Anderson 1995).
5 6 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.54 (Anderson 1995).
5 7 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.01(C) (Anderson 1995).
58 This is a typical workers' compensation injury in which an employee, for example,
suffers a physical injury such as a broken bone after something falls on him at work.
59 This type of claim usually originates where an employee suffers a physical injury
to a specific part of the body, caused by a physical stimulus such as a falling object. After
the claim for physical injury is allowed, the employee then develops a mental condition,
such as a neurosis, which was proximately caused by the physical injury, and seeks
additional allowance.
60Ryan v. Conner, 503 N.E.2d 1379 (Ohio 1986)(recognizing Ohio was the only
remaining state to not include this type of injury as compensable under workers'
compensation).
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mental injuries caused by mental stimuli.6 1 Other than that limited scenario,
workers' compensation was to be the exclusive remedy for all workplace
injuries, and thus, bar all common law remedies.
V. EMERGENCE OF THE COMMON LAW INTENTIONAL TORT EXCEPTION
Over time, the Ohio Supreme Court began to bypass the exclusive remedy
provision in situations when an employee was injured as a result of an
intentional tort committed by the employer.6 2 The Court accomplished this
bypass in two stages. First, the Court stated that only injuries compensable
under the Act were governed by the exclusive remedy provisions. 63 Second,
the Court reasoned that intentional torts were not "accidental" in nature, and
thus not compensable64 or governed by the exclusive remedy provision as
defined by the Act.65 In a sense, the Ohio Supreme Court furthered its own
definition of which injuries were and were not compensable under the workers'
compensation provisions, and essentially, contrived a common law exception
for intentional torts. 66
A. Blankenship, Jones, and Revised Code § 4121.80
The first of several cases recognizing an intentional tort exception to the
exclusivity of workers' compensation was the 1982 Ohio Supreme Court
decision of Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chemicals, Inc.67 The Court held
that Article II, section 35 of the Ohio Constitution and sections 4123.74 and
6 1See Fred J. Pompeani, Mental Stress and Ohio Workers' Compensation: When is a
Stress-Related Condition Compensable?, 40 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 35 (1992).
62 See Douglas Lee Hertlein, Comment, Intentional Torts by Employers in Ohio, The
General Assembly's Solutions: Ohio Revised Code Section 4121.80, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 247,
249 (1987); see, e.g., Mercer v. Uniroyal, Inc., 361 N.E.2d 492 (Ohio Ct. App.
1976)(employee's common law action based on breach of warranty for a defective
product used by the employee in the course of employment allowed because there was
no causal connection between the employment and the injury); See, e.g., Delamotte v.
Midland Ross Corp., 411 N.E.2d 814 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978)(employee's common law
action allowed for employer's fraud).
63 See supra text accompanying notes 54-61.
6 4 See MILLER, supra note 14, at 294-95.
65 See FESMIER, supra note 24, at 418-21 (complete discussion of treatment of accidental
injuries under workers' compensation law in Ohio).
66 See FESMIER, supra note 24, at 419-20 (and cases cited therein)(compensable injuries
must bean "actual, measurable, physical or traumatic damage that occurred at a definite,
particular time and place, unexpectedly, and in the usual course of events."). Id. at
419-20.
67 Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milicron Chemicals, 433 N.E.2d 572 (Ohio), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 857 (1982).
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4123.741 did not preclude an employee who was injured by an employer's
intentional tort from pursuing a common law action.68
In Blankenship, eight plaintiffs alleged that they were injured by exposure to
certain noxious chemicals within the scope of their employment. They stated
that Cincinnati Milacron Chemicals (Milacron) knew of the dangers posed by
the chemicals, knew that certain occupational diseases were being contracted,
and failed to inform the employees.69 The plaintiffs claimed that the failure was
"intentional, malicious and in willful and wanton disregard of their health. " 70
Milacron argued that Article II, section 35, of the Ohio Constitution, and O.R.C.
4123.74 precluded the employee's common law cause of action.71
In holding for the plaintiffs, the Court, citing Delamotte v. Midland Ross, 72
reasoned that an injury caused by an employer's intentional tort is not an injury
arising out of or in the course of employment, and that no employee would
contemplate the risk of an intentional tort.73 Thus, workers' compensation laws
do not give an employer tort immunity for the intentional acts. 74 The Court
further reasoned that granting immunity to employers for intentional tortious
conduct would encourage such intentional conduct by those employers, 75 and
the workers' compensation system should not insure employers for intentional
conduct for public policy reasons.76 Based on these findings, the court
remanded the case to the trial court to determine, as a factual issue, whether
the employer's conduct constituted an intentional tort.77 Unfortunately, the
case was settled before the courts decided what actually constituted an
intentional tort.
Although some other states have supported the position that intentional
torts are not barred by workers' compensation statutes,78 in contrast the
Blankenship decision gave rise to several problems. First, the Court never
6 8 d. at 572-73.
69 d. at 572; For a good explanation of the Blankenship decision, see also Mark Steven
Kanter, Comment, 51 U. CiN. L. REv. 682, 682-83 (1982).
70Blankenship, 433 N.E.2d at 574; see also Felson, supra note 39, at 553.
71Blankenship, 433 N.E.2d at 575-76.
72 Delamotte v. Midland Ross, 411 N.E.2d 814 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978).
73 Blankenship, 433 N.E.2d at 576.
74 Id. at 577.
751d. at 577.
76 d.
77 Id. at 578.
78 See, e.g., McDaniel v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 487 F. Supp. 714 (N.D. Ill.
1978)(fraud and misrepresentation); Elliott v. Brown, 569 P.2d 1323 (Alaska
1977)(assault); Doney v. Tambouratgis, 73 Cal. App. 3d 430 (1977)(assault); Boek v.
Wong Hing, 180 Minn. 470, 231 N.W. 233 (Minn. 1930)(assault); Leopold v. Britt, 58
A.D.2d 856 (N.Y. 1977)(assault).
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defined what constituted an intentional tort, and merely stated that "it is for
the trier of fact to initially determine whether the alleged conduct constitutes
an intentional injury" 79 The Court also did not decide whether an employee
had to elect whether to pursue either workers' compensation benefits or a
common law remedy.80
Two years later, the Ohio Supreme Court addressed these particular issues
in Jones v. VIP Development, Co.81 In Jones, a city employee who worked in a city
light plant died of severe injuries which he sustained in an accident while
becoming trapped in a coal conveyer system.82 Even though Jones had applied
for, and received workers' compensation benefits, the executrix of his estate
brought action against the city alleging that the city knew or should have
known of dangerous conditions which should have been made safe and,
accordingly, the employer should have warned the employee. 83
The Court stated three holdings. First, in determining a standard for an
intentional tort, the Court stated that an intentional tort is "an act committed
with the intent to injure another, or committed with the belief that such injury
is substantially certain to occur."84 Second, the Court held that the receipt of
workers' compensation benefits does not preclude an employee or his
representative from pursuing a common law action for damages against his
employer for an intentional tort.8 5 Finally, the Court held that an employer
found liable for an intentional tort, is not entitled to a setoff of the award in the
amount of the workers' compensation benefits received by the employee or his
representative. 86 Thus, the Ohio Supreme Court flatly rejected three
contentions: (1) that a specific intent to injure is necessary for a finding of
intentional misconduct;87 (2) that an employee has to elect to pursue either
79 Blankenship, 433 N.E.2d at 578; see also Hertlein, supra note 62, at 250-51.
80 See HERTLEIN, supra note 62, at 251.
81Jones v. VIP Development, Co., 472 N.E.2d 1046 (Ohio 1984)(Jones was actually a
consolidation of three cases: Jones, Gains v. City of Painesville, 466 N.E.2d 572 (Ohio Ct.
App. Dec. 30,1983), and Hamlin v. Snow Products, No. 46229 slip. op. at (Ohio Ct. App.
Jan. 5, 1984) superseded by statute Mills v. Schindler Haughton Elevator Corp., Lexis sllp
op. (Ohio Ct. App., Lucas County Nov. 6, 1987)).
82Jones, 472 N.E.2d 1046.
831d. at 1048-53; In Gains, a coal chute operator was fatally injured reaching into a
coal chute, of which the employer had previously removed the safety guard. 466 N.E.2d
at 572. The complaint alleged the employer's actions were intentional, malicious, willful
and wanton. In Hamlin, the employees alleged they received physical injury while
exposed to toxic chemicals at work, although the company knew of the hazardous
workplace and misrepresented the safety to the employees. The court characterized the
employer's actions as malicious, willful and reckless.
84 Id. at 1047 (relying on 1 RESTATEMENT OFTHE LAW 2D, TORTS (1965) 15, Section 8A.).
85Id. at 1047-48.
86Jones, 472 N.E.2d at 1048.
871d. at 1051.
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workers' compensation or a common law remedy; and (3) that the employer
may not setoff any workers' compensation awards against a common law
finding of liability.88
With the decision in Jones, the Ohio Supreme Court upset the balance and
equilibrium initially established by the workers' compensation system in favor
of Ohio employees. Similar to the decision in Triff v. National Bronze,89
employers and labor organizations quickly responded by creating a perception
that a "workers' compensation crisis" existed in the State of Ohio and that Ohio
would not be able to attract new business or expand or maintain those
businesses already in the state.90 In response, the Ohio legislature enacted Ohio
Revised Code section 4121.80 in Amended Substitute Senate Bill 307.91
Section 4121.80 was ultimately a legislative statement that the new liberal
approach established by the judiciary in regard to workers' compensation
provisions was not appropriate. The House and Labor Committee in the
introductory paragraph of its report on House Bill 307 stated:
[e]xisting law confers upon employers who comply with the Workers'
Compensation law immunity from civil suit by employees who sustain
injury or occupational disease 'in the course of or arising out of
employment.' Until recently, this provision was thought to bar
virtually any type of civil damages suit by an employee against an
employer.
92
The legislature apparently believed that workers' compensation should be
an exclusive remedy for employees and that the court in Blankenship, and later
in Jones, had misinterpreted its intent.93 The primary purpose of workers'
compensation was not to protect and compensate the worker by "improv[ing]
the plight of the injured worker, '94 but the purpose was to effectuate a balance
between the workers' and employers' interests.95 The legislature declared that:
[the] enactment of Chapter 4123. of the Revised Code and the
establishment of the workers' compensation system is intended to
remove from the common law tort system all disputes between or
88 d. at 1047-48 (syllabus).
89 See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
90Jerald D. Harris, Ohio Workers' Compensation Act 31, at 3 (1986)(quoting Senator
Finan who stated that his main goal in initiating legislation was "the reversal of the
Blankenship problem .... ); see also Felson, supra note 39, at 554-55.
911986 Ohio Laws 718; For an in-depth discussion of Section 4121.80, see also Hertlein,
supra note 62.
92 House Commerce and Labor Committee, 116th General Assembly, Am. Sub. S.B.
307, at 3 (1986).
93 See Hertlein, supra note 62, at 252.
94 Blankenship, 433 N.E.2d at 577.
95 See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
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among employers and employees regarding the compensation to be
received for injury or death to an employee [and] ... that the immunity
... is an essential aspect of Ohio's workers' compensation system .... 96
Therefore, to keep the balance of interests between employers and
employees in intentional tort situations where the Ohio Supreme Court was
ruling that an employee had a common law cause of action, section 4121.80
specifically: (1) made all defenses available to the employer including
contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, and the fellow servant rule;97
(2) eliminated a trial by jury for the employee by stating that the court will make
the determination of the issue of liability of the intentional tort;98 (3) established
an intentional tort fund to pay for legal fees and damages;9 9 (4) stated that the
recoverable damages are only those in excess of workers' compensation
benefits; 100 (5) set limitations on the amount of recovery an employee could
receive; 10 1 and (6) stated that these provisions applied to all claims pending.102
Most importantly, though, the legislature in section 4121.80(G) defined an
intentional tort as "an act committed with the intent to injure another or
committed with the belief that the injury is substantially certain to occur."103
While this wording is similar to Jones' language, the legislature further defined
"substantially certain," to mean that "an employer acts with deliberate intent to
cause an employee to suffer injury, disease, condition, or death."104 This limited
definition of "substantial certainty" indicated a legislative intent to disregard
the expansive interpretation of intentional tort as found in Jones, and attempted
to bring Ohio in line with most other jurisdictions. 105
96OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4121.80(B)(Page 1986)(emphasis added); see also Hertlein,
supra note 62, at 252.
9 7 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4121.80(A).
981d. § 4121.80(D)(arguing the words "court" and "judicial" as phrased by the
legislature indicate that a trial by jury was eliminated); see also Wiley, supra note 23, at
512-14.
9 9 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4121.80(E).
100§ 4121.80(A)(allowing for employer "set-off' of awards).
10 11d. § 4121.80(D)(providing Industrial Commission would determine damages, not
a jury).
1021d. § 4121.80(H)(legislature intent to retroactively apply this statute to all pending
claims).
1030H10 REV. CODE ANN. § 4121.80(G).
104§ 4121.80(G)(1). Two specific scenarios creating a rebuttable presumption that an
employer acted with the intent to injure another were stated specifically: (1) deliberate
removal by the employer of an equipment safety guard and (2) deliberate
misrepresentation of a toxic or hazardous substance.
105See Hertlein, supra note 62, at 257-58; See also 2A LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION § 68.13 n.10.1 (1983)[hereinafter LARSON 2A]; (For an in-depth analysis
of the history of intentional torts) Blankenship through Fyffe, see also Lisa A. Rutenschroer,
Note, The Ohio "Standard"for Workplace Intentional Torts: Fyffe v. Jeno's Inc., 570 N.E.2d
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This legislation, however, met severe constitutional scrutiny in Brady v.
Safety-Kleen.106 In Brady, the Ohio Supreme Court held that section 4121.80 was
unconstitutional in toto.107 The Court held that section 4121.80 exceeded the
legislative authority granted to the General Assembly under both sections 34108
and 35109 of Article II, of the Ohio Constitution. The legislature had violated
Article II, section 34 by eliminating the right to an intentional tort common law
cause of action that would otherwise benefit the employee and, therefore, such
a law did not further... the comfort, health, or general welfare of employees
within the meaning of that section.1 10 Further, the Court held that Article II,
section 35 did not apply because employer intentional torts were outside the
scope of and unrelated to employment.111
As a result of the Ohio Supreme Court's ruling in Brady, the intentional tort
exception to the exclusive remedy provision of Ohio's workers' compensation
scheme existed under the common law standards as set forth in Blankenship
and Jones.n 2 However, there was still much confusion among the courts. This
confusion was especially true in cases where there was no showing of specific
intent to injure, but there was a showing of more than mere negligence. n 3 Van
Fossen, Pariseau, and Fyffe were all attempts by the judiciary to clarify the
intentional tort standard.
B. Van Fossen, Pariseau, and Fyffe
In Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., an employee was injured when he
slipped and fell backing down a stairway which another employee had earlier
welded together.114 The injured employee claimed that the employer knew the
steps were installed dangerously due to previous accidents, yet failed to take
corrective measures and continued to allow the employees to use the unsafe
1108 (Ohio 1991), 61 U. CiN. L. REV. 331 (1992).
106 Brady v. Safety-Kleen, 576 N.E.2d 722 (Ohio 1991).
107 For a complete discussion of § 4121.80 prior to Brady v. Safety Kleen, see Hertlein,
supra note 62.
108 OHio CoNsr. art. II, §§ 34, 35 (West 1995)("Laws may be passed fixing and
regulating the hours of labor, establishing a minimum wage, and providing for the
comfort, health, safety and general welfare of all employees; and no other provision of
the constitution shall impair or limit this power.") Id. at § 34.
109 0HIO CONST. art. II, § 35.
110Brady, 576 N.E.2d at 728.
111Id. at 729 (quoting Taylor v. Academy Iron & Metal Co., 522 N.E.2d 464, 476
(Douglas, J., dissenting)).
112 See Rutenschroer, supra note 105, at 346-47.
113 See Rutenschroer, supra note 105, at 347 (and notes cited therein).
114 Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 522 N.E.2d 489, 492 (Ohio 1988).
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steps.115 The employee also alleged that the employer's disregard of the
dangerous steps with the knowledge that accidents were substantially certain
to occur constituted an intentional tort as defined by the Blankenship and Jones
standards.11 6 The Ohio Supreme Court, however, rejected the employee's
claim, stating that a typical personal injury "slip and fall" case, without any
evidence of an employer's wrongdoing, would not support an intentional tort
finding.117
To establish an intentional tort by an employer, proof beyond that required
to prove negligence or recklessness must be established.118 Specific intent is not
needed, only a "virtual certainty" that the accident would occur.119 The Van
Fossen court then established its own three-prong test based upon the
Restatement of Torts and Prosser and Keeton, but in addition to the Restatement
position, also required that the employer have knowledge of the danger as a
prerequisite. 120 In essence, the Van Fossen court adopted a variation of the
Restatement of Torts 2d as referenced in Jones.
In a decision published the same day as Van Fossen, the Ohio Supreme Court
in Pariseau v. Wedge Products 121 further tried to refine its definition of what
constituted a common law intentional tort in the workplace. In Pariseau, an
employee was injured when a punch press he was operating malfunctioned
and the pullback restraint guards, designed to pull the operator's hands away
from the press, failed.122 The employee alleged intentional tortious conduct,
stating that the company's foreman instructed the employee to operate the
press despite knowledge of the press's previous failure, and that the foreman
had improperly adjusted the pullback restraints. 123 However, the Court held
in favor of the employer stating that without a showing that the employer knew
of the harm, the employer's actions were not the result of intentional conduct,
but of mere negligence.124
1 1 51d.
116id.
1171d. at 505.
118 Van Fossen, 522 N.E.2d at 491.
119 See Rutenschroer, supra note 105, at 348.
120 Van Fossen, 522 N.E.2d at 504. Under the Van Fossen test, an injured employee must
prove: (1) knowledge by the employer of a dangerous condition or process within his
business operation; (2) knowledge by the employer that if the employee were subjected
to such dangers, harm to the employee would be a "substantial certainty" and not merely
a "high risk;" and (3) despite this knowledge, the employer required the employee to
continue performing the dangerous task.
12 1 Pariseau v. Wedge Products, 522 N.E.2d 511 (Ohio 1988).
1221d. at 512.
1231d. at 514.
1241d. at 514-15.
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Pursuant to Pariseau, to establish an intentional tort, an employee must show
that the employer manifested an intent to injure the employee, and that the
intent included the knowledge and expectation that such injury was
substantially certain to occur.1 25 The court stated that under the substantial
certainty test, the issue was whether reliable, probative evidence was available
to show that the employer intentionally acted in this manner despite a "known
threat of harm" to the employee. 126 The Pariseau Court stated that a crucial
element of substantial certainty is that the possibility of harm that may come
to the employee if subjected to the dangerous condition or process, must
amount to more than a high risk.127 As set forth, the standard was more
restrictive than the Restatement's substantial certainty test, but required much
less than specific intent.
Three years later, however, the Ohio Supreme Court decided another
standard for workplace intentional torts in Fyffe v. Jeno's Inc.128 In Fyffe, an
employee brought a cause of action against his employer for allegedly
removing a safety guard from a conveyor belt, and directing the employee to
clean the machine while it was running.129 He alleged that those acts
constituted an intentional tort by his employer because the acts were
substantially certain to result in harm.130 The majority began by addressing the
various differences between Blankenship, Jones, Van Fossen, Pariseau, and the
Restatement, and admitted there was confusion among the courts. 13 1
Overall, the majority in Fyffe stated that the common law standard for
establishing an intentional tort was premised upon the law of section 8(A) of
the Restatement and section 8 of Prosser and Keeton, and that the same standards
had remained from Jones through the Van Fossen trilogy.132 The Court amended
the Van Fossen three-prong test 133 and stated that in some situations, acts
creating a "high risk" of harm could rise to the level of substantial certainty and
reasonably raise an issue of whether or not the employer committed an
intentional tort.1 34 Even though the Court expressed its desire to not materially
125 Pariseau, 522 N.E.2d at 516.
126Id.
1271d. at 516-519 (Holmes, J., concurring).
128Fyffe v. Jeno's Inc., 570 N.E.2d 1108 (Ohio 1991).
129 d. at 1110.
1301d.
131 d. at 1111.
1321d. at 1112.
133Fyffe, 570 N.E.2d at 1111-12.
134 Id.
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change the law,135 this statement was in direct contrast to the Van Fossen court
which stated that a high risk of harm is merely recklessness, and does not rise
to the level of an intentional tort136
In sum, the Court in Fyffe deleted the Van Fossen and Pariseau language that
distinguished activities with a high risk of harm to employees from those
involving a substantial certainty of harm, and decided that recklessness may
be equated with an intentional tort. The effect of these changes resulted in a
decision, though meant to clarify past ambiguities, that changed the law of
intentional tort liability. Fyffe therefore liberalized the substantial certainty test
and developed a more lenient and expansive standard for an intentional tort
than even previously set forth in Jones, Van Fossen and Pariseau.137
VI. LEGISLATURE'S NEW RESPONSE-OHIO REVISED CODE § 2745.01
A. Enactment of Ohio Revised Code § 2745.01
As it stood after Fyffe, the status of the common law exception to workers'
compensation for intentional torts in the workplace was still unsettled. The
judiciary had created a common law exception for intentional torts, and the
long established employer-employee equal compromise which had served as
the foundation of the Ohio Workers' Compensation Act, was replaced with a
system favoring the employee. No longer would an employer have common
law immunity from workplace injuries as stated in the Ohio Constitution and
prior case law.138 Now, an employer not only had to compulsorily pay into the
workers' compensation system, but also had to defend common law tort
actions in many cases where an employee merely alleged an intentional tort
though the evidence could support no more than mere negligence. 139
135 1d. at 1112.
1361d. As modified, the Fyffe court's new three-prong test states in its syllabus:
To establish an intentional tort of an employee, proof beyond that
required to prove negligence and beyond that required to prove
recklessness must be established. Where the employer acts despite
his knowledge of some risk, his conduct may be negligence. As
the probability increases that particular consequences may follow,
the employer's conduct may be characterized as recklessness. As
the probability that the consequences will follow further increases,
and the employer knows that injuries to employees are certain or
substantially certain to result from the process, procedure or condi-
tion and he still proceeds, he is treated by the law as if he had in fact
desired to produce the result. However, the mere knowledge and
appreciation of a risk-something short of substantial certainty-is
not intent.
Id.
137 See Rutenschroer, supra note 105, at 356 (citing to Justice Douglas's concurring
opinion).
138 OHIo CONST. art. II, § 35.
139 See Rutenschroer, supra note 105, at 359.
1996]
19Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1996
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
On November 1, 1995, as a reaction to Fyffe, et al, Ohio Governor George
Voinovich signed Ohio House Bill 103, later codified in Ohio Revised Code
section 2745.01 creating an "Employment Intentional Tort."140 This legislation
overruled several Ohio Supreme Court decisions14 1 and established the Ohio
standard for workplace intentional torts. Newly enacted section 2745.01 states
that an employer is not subject to damages at common law for an intentional
tort that occurs during the course of employment; an employer is only subject
to liability for an "employment intentional. tort."142 As used in this section, an
"employment intentional tort" means, "an act committed by an employer in
which the employee deliberately and intentionally injures, causes an
occupational disease of, or causes the death of an employee."143
B. Responding Exclusively to a Workers' Compensation Problem
As a reaction to an exclusively workers' compensation problem, section
2745.01 is clearly far less extensive than its predecessor, which was held
unconstitutional in Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp. Section 2745.01 does not include
provisions requiring: (1) an intentional tort fund to be established; (2) the
elimination of a jury trial for the employee; (3) limitations on the amount of
employee recovery; (4) that the statute should be applied retroactively; and (5)
that an employer may set-off of damages from an intentional tort action and a
workers' compensation claim. 144
The significance of section 2745.01 is that this statute represents a major
attempt by the legislature to isolate the specific issue of intentional torts in the
workplace sufficient to pass constitutional scrutiny. In its efforts, the Ohio
legislature defines intentional tort, and gives a workable standard for the Ohio
courts to apply. Though the section 2745.01 standard is more stringent than the
Ohio Supreme Court's or the Restatement of Torts' position, it is a standard that
should be followed.
Specifically, the Ohio legislature overruled Blankenship, Jones, Van Fossen,
Pariseau, and Fyffe. 145 By doing so, the legislature has eliminated several of the
140 See supra note 2.
141See supra note 4. Specifically, the cases overruled are as follows: Blankenship, Jones,
Van Fossen, Pariseau, Hunter, and Fyffe.
14 2 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2745.01(A)(Anderson 1995).
14 3 0Hio REV. CODE ANN. § 2745.01(A), (B), and (D); see also note 2 and accompanying
text.
144OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4121.80 (Anderson 1986).
145 The Ohio Legislature has also overruled Hunter v. Shenago Furnace Co., 38 Ohio
St. 3d 124 (1988). In that case, the Ohio Supreme Court held:
[u]nless the circumstances of an action clearly indicate a battery or any
other enumerated intentional tort in the Revised Code, a cause of action
alleging bodily injury as a result of an intentional tort by an employer
arising prior to the effective date of R.C. 4121.80 will be governed by the
two-year statute of limitations established in R.C. 2305.10.
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problems and confusion associated with intentional torts in the workplace. The
legislature has abandoned the "substantially certain to occur" language created
by the Ohio courts, and inserted a provision requiring an employee attempting
to prove an intentional tort in the workplace to show that the employer
"deliberately and intentionally injures."'1 46
Although former section 4121.80 also contained "deliberate intent" as part of
its definition of "substantially certain" language, section 4121.80 implied that
the legislature's test for an intentional tort was that the tort was "committed
with the intent to injure or with the deliberate intent to injure."147 And unless
those two phrases in section 4121.80 were read as a redundancy as having the
same meanings, the former phrase must have been some standard less than
deliberate intent (i.e. willful, wanton, or reckless). 148 On the other hand, section
2745.01 provides that an employee must prove deliberate and intentional
conduct by the employer. Thus, the legislature has in essence, declared the
Jones, Fyffe, Van Fossen, and Pariseau tests insufficient and not intended, and that
an employee will not be able to state a claim for an intentional tort simply
alleging recklessness or a "virtual certainty" of danger.149
All of these consequences, though seemingly unfair to employees, are a
logical solution to the imbalance created by the judiciary. In the scheme of
workers' compensation, the argument against judicial activism is strong.
Unlike other areas of tort law which were developed by the courts,150 workers'
compensation has always been a "child of the legislature."151 The legislature
has weighed through pain-staking and thoughtful processes the various
interests between employers and employees. 15 2 Arguably, the judiciary tipped
the scale in favor of employees without regard to the system of competing
interests. The Ohio Supreme Court has made a sweeping change in the law
without justifying its role in the change, looking at prior precedent,153 or
The court stated that if the legislature wants to provide a specific statute of
limitations for a specific tort, it must do so legislatively. Interestingly, when George
Voinovich signed House Bill 107, Ohio Revised Code § 2305.112 was also enacted
addressing this point. Under 2305.112, the statute of limitations for an "employment
intentional tort" is one year.
14 6 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2745.01(D)(1)(Anderson 1995).
147See Hertlein, supra note 62, at 257.
1481d.
149 All of these provisions were holdings, at least in part, of the overruled cases.
150 Examples include the public policy exception to at-will employment and wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy.
151See Patricia C. Cecil, Comment, The Role of the Supreme Court in Opening the
Courtroom Doors to Tort Victims, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 477, 494 (1986)[hereinafter cited as
Role].
15 2Id. at 494-95.
153Id. at 494.
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deferring to the legislative power granted in the Ohio Constitution under
Article II, section 35.
By creating this new standard of "deliberate and intentional acts," the
legislature is effectively re-balancing the interests involved and eliminating the
judicially created unfairness and inconsistencies. For example, the Court in
Jones classified intentional torts as outside the scheme of worker's
compensation and not covered by the statute; then stated that an intentional
tort award is a "supplement" to workers' compensation allowing an employee
to recover under workers' compensation and common law,154 while denying
employers the ability to set-off the civil judgment.155 This effectively gave
employees double recovery.156 Not only did an employer have to pay under
both systems, but now the employer had to incur significant litigation expenses
in the process.
The judiciary also treated an act as negligent and compensable under
workers' compensation, and at the same time, intentional and compensable
under common law. Employees were not only alleging alternative theories of
liability, but also recovering under both theories. The courts ignored the fact
that intentional and negligent actions are mutually exclusive, 157 a concept
recognized in many other jurisdictions. 158 By overruling Jones and its progeny
in section 2745.01, the legislature is merely reconciling these inconsistencies.
Further, Ohio's judicially created standard for workplace intentional torts
requiring proof less than specific intent was contrary to other states and the
only state in the country with such a liberal application. 159 The Ohio courts,
nevertheless, did not try to justify the exclusion of intentional torts from the
immunity of workers' compensation system, or justify such an expansive
definition of intent.160 The Ohio Supreme Court in Blankenship and Jones merely
stressed the "plight of the innocent victim,"161 and stated that "the protection
154jones, 472 N.E.2d at 1055.
155Id.
156 The court in Jones disagrees with a notion of double recovery because the
'common-law award represents a supplemental remedy for pain and suffering, and
spousal loss of services. It also provides an avenue for the imposition of punitive
sanctions on employers who engage in intentional wrongdoing. None of these types of
relief is available under the [Workers' Compensation] Act."
15 7Varnes v. Willis Day Moving and Storage Co., No. CI 82-1949 (Lucas Cty. (April
1, 1983)), unreported; see also, John C. West, Comments: In the Wake of Blankenship:
Following Footprints Into the Mire of Intentional Torts in the Workplace in Ohio, 12 N. KY. L.
REV. 267,270-280 (1985)(explaining election of remedies, set-off, and various arguments
for and against whether these actions are mutually exclusive).
15 8Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.610(4)(Baldwin 1984); see, e.g., ARZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 23-1022(A)(Supp. 1984); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. § 65-05-06 (1983).
15 9See LARSON 2A, supra note 105, at § 68.
160See Role, supra note 151, at 495 and cases cited therein.
161Blankenship, 433 N.E.2d at 577.
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afforded by the Act has been for negligent acts and not for intentional tortious
conduct."162 In support of its original position in Blankenship, the Ohio Supreme
Court placed significant reliance on West Virginia's Supreme Court case of
Mandolidis v. Elkins Industries, Inc.16 3
In 1913, West Virginia created a statutory exception to its workers'
compensation laws for intentional torts by enacting section 23-4-2 of the West
Virginia Code. 164 The West Virginia Supreme Court interpreted the definition
of intentional tort created by the legislature by stating in Mandolidis thata civil
cause of action could be maintained when an employer's conduct was willful,
wanton, or reckless. 165 In 1984, however, the West Virginia legislature amended
section 23-4-2 to define "deliberate intention" more specifically, and required
that an employee prove his employer "acted with a consciously, subjectively
and deliberately formed intention to produce the specific result of injury or
death to an employee."'166 A showing of willful, wanton, or reckless misconduct
was deemed inadequate. 167 Therefore, the precedent relied upon by the Ohio
Supreme Court's decision in Blankenship has since been overruled by the West
Virginia legislature.
As one commentator stated:
[s]ince the legal justification for the common-law action is the
non-accidental character of the injury from the defendant employer's
standpoint, the common-law liability of the employer cannot, under
the almost unanimous rule, be stretched to include accidental injuries
caused by the gross, wanton, willful, deliberate, intentional, reckless,
culpable, or malicious negligence, breach of statute or other
misconduct of the employer short of genuine intentional injury.168
In support of his "almost unanimous rule," the commentator notes cases from
thirty-one states that require specific intent,169 while only two cases are noted
which allowed actions for less than that standard: West Virginia's
1621d.; but see Greenwalt v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 128 N.E.2d 116 (Ohio
1955)(holding workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy and that an employee
may not bring an action for fraud or deceit); but see Zajachuck v. Willard Storage Battery
Co., 140 N.E. 405 (Ohio 1922)(holding no common law remedy available even if the
injury was not compensable under the Ohio Workers' Compensation Act).
16 3Blankenship, 433 N.E.2d at 577 (citing Mandolidis v. Elkins Industries, Inc., 246
S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1978)).
164 W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2 (1985)(allowing common law recovery for an intentional tort
against an employer outside of workers' compensation's exclusivity provision).
165 Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus. Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907, n.2d (W. Va. 1978).
166 W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2(c)(2)(i)(similar to a broad range substantial certainty test).
167§ 23-4-2(c)(2)(i)(C).
168 See LARSON 2A, supra note 105, § 68.13 at 13-8, 13-9.
169 See LARSON 2A, supra note 105, § 68.13 n.l at 13-9 to 13-21 (citing other states
requiring specific intent).
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Mandolidis,170 subsequently curtailed to require deliberate intent, and Ohio's
Blankenship, affirmed by Jones through Fyffe.
It is not a coincidence that other states have retreated from a "substantially
certain to occur" definition of an intentional tort allowing a common law cause
of action for willful or high risk activities by the employer. As the West Virginia
legislature even noted when it legislatively overruled the Mandolidis decision,
a showing of less than deliberate intent will result in a number of very large
jury verdicts for the plaintiffs.171 In one case, the jury verdict was for $4,000,000,
reportedly three times the value of the company's total assets.172
Further, a recent survey found that "nearly forty percent of companies
consider the costs of a state workers' compensation system before deciding
where to locate operations. In manufacturing, fifty-six percent [of companies]
considered the cost as a location factor."173 By allowing a common law
intentional tort action based upon a "substantial certainty" standard that
includes recklessness, it will not be long before Ohio runs the risk of
encouraging companies to locate elsewhere and deprive the state of needed
revenues.
This is not to say that Ohio should entirely abandon an intentional tort
exception to the exclusivity of workers' compensation. The justifications for
allowance of a common law action are strong.174 However, the Ohio judiciary
should merely let the Ohio legislature determine the appropriate standard to
apply as granted to them in the powers of article II, section 35 of the Ohio
Constitution. The Ohio judiciary should not rule on its own concept of justice,
and should stop upsetting the legislatively created balance of competing
interests between employers and employees that have stood the test of time
and which continues to have modem day applicability.175
In enacting section 2745.01, the Ohio General Assembly has defined the
standard of an intentional tort in the workplace as a standard requiring specific
intent and deliberateness on the part of the employer.176 This was a proper step
in the direction of workers' compensation reform. In overruling the supreme
court decisions in the Blankenship line of cases, the Ohio legislature is only doing
what a majority (almost every other state except Ohio) has done legislatively.
170 Mandolidis, 246 S.E.2d at 907 (1978).
17 1See Note, In Wake of Mandolidis: A Case Study of Recent Trials Brought Under the
Mandolidis Theory, 84 W. VA. L. REv. 893 (1982)(discussing Mandolidis generally).
1 72 Cline v. Joy Mfg. Co., No. 79-C-8036 (Cir. Ct. Mingo Cty), rev'd, 310 S.E.2d 835 (W.
Va. 1983).
173Workers' Compensation Costs Found Soaring, 135 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 535 (Dec. 12,
1990)(the study was conducted by Tillinghast, a risk management consulting company).
174See Miller, supra note 14, at 293-95 (justifying tort actions on grounds that
intentional torts are outside the realm of workers' compensation).
175See Role, supra note 151, at 500.
176 0Hio REv. CODE ANN. § 2745.01(D)(Anderson 1995).
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Section 2745.01 creates a common law exception to the exclusive remedy
provision of workers' compensation where an employee must prove specific
intent to injure on the part of the employer. It does not eliminate the intentional
tort exception and retreat to the status of Pre-Blankenship law; section 2745.01
merely defines when that limited exception should be applied.
C. Overreaching of Section 2745.01-Sections (B) and (C).
In creating the parameters for the intentional tort exception, however, the
Ohio legislature has interjected problems of statutory wording and
excessiveness. Section 2745.01(B) states that an employee or the dependent
survivors of a deceased alleging an "employment intentional tort" must prove
by "clear and convincing evidence that the employer deliberately committed
all of the elements of an employment intentional tort."177 In section 2745.01(C),
the Ohio General Assembly has expressed that this heightened "clear and
convincing" standard should be applied to an employee responding to an
employer's motion for summary judgment and quotes a section similar to
Federal Rule 11178 requiring every pleading, motion, or other paper be signed
by at least one party of record in the individual's name, and that if this section
is ignored, the court shall impose appropriate sanctions. 179 The rationale is
supposedly to create a high burden of proof making it more difficult for
employees to file suit against employers,180 and to address employer's
concerns of frivolous lawsuits and the legal costs associated with defending
common law suits.181
While these may be concerns, the inclusion of these provisions in the statute
is extreme. To impose a clear and convincing standard of proof, in addition to
requiring specific intent, distorts the very balance the legislature was trying to
achieve. Forseeably, it will be extremely difficult for an employee to prove a
case of intentional tort in anything short of a flagrant battery. With the threat
of sanctions it is also foreseeable that an employees attorney will not want to
file employee cases, otherwise risk being punished for what the court feels was
1771d. § 2745.01(B).
178 FED R. Civ. P. 11 (requiring pleadings, motions, and other papers submitted to the
court to either be signed in good faith, or subject to sanctions).
179OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2745.01(C)(stating that appropriate sanctions may include,
but are not limited to, reasonable expenses incurred due to the filing of the paper and
attorney's fees).
18 0See Erika L. Haupt, Comment, Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp.: Tipping Ohio's Workers'
Compensation Scale in Favor of the Employee, 54 OHIo ST. L.J. 837, 856 (1993)(stating
rationale for Amended Substitute House Bill 107 which has similar wording as section
2745.01).
18 1 0ne of the concerns employers had as a result of the expansive definition of
intentional tort was that every plaintiff would file both workers' compensation and
intentional tort in every case whether they had a case or not.
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not a "good faith" argument, or for "causing unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of the action."18 2
A second criticism of the "clear and convincing" standard is that it may raise
constitutional issues. The Ohio Supreme Court has already suggested that
applying a different standard to actions between employers and employees,
different from other tort actions between non-employers and non-employees,
may create an equal protection issue.183 Further, this statute also suggests that
this heightened standard of proof only applies to intentional tort actions by
employees versus employers, not vice-versa. These implications, in light of the
Ohio Supreme Court's quick response to legislation in this area of law, seem
like an invitation for judicial scrutiny.
Sections 2745.01(B) and (C) were not needed to address the employer's
concerns. Merely by changing the standard from "substantial certainty" to
"deliberate and intentional" in Section (A), the legislature had already
addressed the issue of frivolous lawsuits, widespread litigation problems, and
had already balanced the competing interests between employers and
employees of which the judiciary had tipped in favor of the employees.
However, by extending the requisite degree of proof to a "clear and convincing"
standard, the Ohio General Assembly has jeopardized the foundation of the
reform it was trying to make. As the Ohio Supreme Court ruled in Brady
declaring section 4121.80 unconstitutional in toto, it will only be a matter of time
that the same determination of section 2745.01 will have to be made. Unless the
severability clause in House Bill 103184 is heeded, the entire statute seems
doomed.
D. Creation of an Entirely New Cause of Action in Ohio
The discussion, thus far, was limited to a strictly workers' compensation
problem and the injuries associated therein. The wording of section 2745.01,
however, may have much greater implications, and even suggests that this
statute was not enacted to address a purely workers' compensation problem.
The broad language of the statute may also suggest the creation of an entirely
18 2 0Hio REV. CODE ANN. § 2745.01(C)(2).
18 31n Brady v. Safety-Kleen, 576 N.E.2d 722, 730 (Ohio 1991), Justice Douglas in his
concurring opinion stressed that he could not see a legitimate state interest in creating
a special intentional tort victim category within the class of all victims of intentional
torts. Although he was referring to the constitutionality of section 4121.80(D), his
argument may equally apply to newly enacted section 2745.01 of the Ohio Revised Code
12.9(b).
1841995 Ohio Laws 43 (H.B. 103). Section 4 states "[i]f any provision of a section of this
act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity
does not affect other provisions or applications of the section or related sections which
can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the
provisions are severable."
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new cause of action for employees seeking common law remedies against
employers. 185
Taken literally, section (A) states that an employer shall not be liable at
common law or by statute for an intentional tort that occurs during the course
of employment. 186 Only if the employee can prove by "clear and convincing
evidence" that an "employment intentional tort" was committed, will an
employee have a common law cause of action. 187 As stated, an "employment
intentional tort" means an "act committed by an employer in which the
employer deliberately and intentionally injures, causes an occupational disease
of, or causes the death of an employee. 188
The key problem with the statutory wording of section 2745.01 is that the
language appears to apply to both physical and non-physical injuries, whether
caused by physical or non-physical stimuli, even though the latter has never
been covered by the Ohio workers' compensation system. 189 For example,
suppose a female employee is allegedly sexually harassed by her manager and
brings a state common law action against her employer stating that she suffered
psychological injury as a result of a manager attempting to touch her breasts,
and the manager exposing himself to her.19 0 The employer then moves for
summary judgment alleging that the employee failed to state a cause of action,
relying on the Ohio workers' compensation exclusive remedy provisions.
In that particular situation, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that the term
"injury" when applied to the Ohio Workers' Compensation Act does not
include a non-physical injury with purely psychological consequences. 191
Therefore, the woman employee would have a common law cause of action
under Ohio law, irrespective of an intentional tort exception. The sexual
harassment allegedly inflicted amounts to emotional stress, and because the
plaintiff claimed psychological harm from it, her injuries did not fall within the
types of injuries contemplated by the workers' compensation statute.192 Under
185 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2745.01 (A)(Anderson 1995)("Except as provided in this
section, an employer shall not be liable to respond in damages at common law or by
statute for an intentional tort that occurs during the course of employment. An employer
only shall be subject to liability to an employee or the dependent survivors of a deceased
employee in a civil action for damages for an employment intentional tort.").
18 6Rd.
18 70Hio REV. CODE ANN. § 2745.01(B).
188OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2745.01(D).
189 See supra text accompanying notes 57-61.
190 See e.g., Kerans v. Porter Paints, 575 N.E.2d 428 (Ohio 1991).
1911d. at 431. ("We are not prepared to assume that psychological disturbances arising
solely from emotional stress in the workplace fit within the definition of "injury" in R.C.
4123.01."). Id. at 430-31.
192 For a complete discussion of Kerans v. Porter Paint Co. and the types of injuries
associated with workers' compensation in Ohio, see Deborah S. Brenneman, Note, Sexual
Harassment and Ohio's Workers' Compensation Statute: Kerans v. Porter Paint Co., 575
19961
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the law prior to section 2745.01, the exclusive remedy provision of workers'
compensation would not apply, and based upon the particular facts of the case,
summary judgment on behalf of the employer would be denied. 193
On the other hand, if those same facts were applied to section 2745.01, which
does not state whether the injuries normally excluded from the workers'
compensation scheme are covered, the case may have a different result. To
survive the employer's motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff employee
would have to prove by clear and convincing evidence that her employer
"deliberately and intentionally" sexually harassed her.194 The plaintiff's
attorney could also be subject to sanctions by "the court, upon motion or upon
its own initiative" if the court determines the attorney did not make a good
faith claim.1 95 Clearly, if the courts apply these facts in this manner to section
2745.01, the results may be extreme.
Another situation in which it would be easy to see the extreme implications
of this statutory interpretation is when section 2745.01 is applied to a wrongful
discharge action. For example, in Collins v. Rizkana, 196 an employee brought a
wrongful discharge action based upon alleged sexual harassment. The
employee was allegedly constructively discharged for refusing to write a
statement that the defendant, her employer, had never touched her sexually,
although it allegedly happened on numerous occasions. 19 7 The Ohio Supreme
Court reversed the trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the
employer and held that a cause of action may be brought for wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy against an employer based upon sexual
harassment.198
Again, a much different result may occur if newly enacted section 2745.01
were applied to the facts in Collins. A wrongful discharge situation usually
occurs in the "course of employment" and is intentional in nature. An employer
usually fires an employee, rightfully or wrongfully, for reasons or situations
related to the workplace. Therefore, "an employer shall not be liable to respond
in damages at common law or by statute for an intentional tort."199 Under
section 2745.01, Collins only has a common law cause of action if she can
establish an "employment intentional tort" and the parties involved fit within
the definitions in the statute.
N.E.2d 428 (Ohio 1991), 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1515 (1993).
19 3Kerans, 575 N.E.2d at 428.
194OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2745.01(A)-(B) (Anderson 1995).
19 5 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2745.01(C)(2).
196 Collins v. Rizkana, 652 N.E.2d 653 (Ohio 1995).
1 9 7 d. at 655-656.
198 d. at 654-655, syllabus.
1 9 9 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2745.01 (A).
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As defined by statute, Collins was an employee (an individual employed by
an employer), Rizkana was an employer (any person who employs an
individual), and Collins was employed (permitted or suffered to work) by
Rizkana. 200 Thus, section 2745.01 is to "completely and solely control all causes
of action,"201 and Collins must prove by clear and convincing evidence that she
was deliberately and intentionally injured (discharged in violation of public
policy based upon sexual harassment) because of her employer's act.202 Collins
must adhere to the stringent pleading requirements requiring her or her
attorney to state that "to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and
belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law .... "203
Finally, Collins or her attorney must subject themselves to possible sanctions
including reasonable expenses and attorney's fees.204 Hypothetically, a much
different result may occur than in the original holding.
While this expansive interpretation of section 2745.01 covering injuries not
normally associated with Ohio workers' compensation law may seem
farfetched, there is some support from the legislature that indicates this is the
proper application. First, this new definition and creation of an "employment
intentional tort" was not enacted as a section of Revised Code Chapter 41 on
Workers' Compensation. Instead, it is found under Title XXVII
Courts-General Provisions-Special Remedies. If the legislature had been
addressing the exclusive remedy provision of workers' compensation and the
injuries associated therein, why didn't the legislature put this in Chapter 41?205
Second, new definitions of employer, employee, and employ were
created.206 These terms are defined much more broadly than in the workers'
compensation arena, and apply to all employers and employees whether or not
20 0OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2745.01(D)(2)-(4).
20 1This phraseology refers to the legislative intent statement in 1995 Ohio Laws 43
(H.B. 103 section 3).
202 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2745.01(B).
2 0 3 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2745.01 (C)(2).
204id.
205 0ne reason the legislature may not have included this section in Revised Code
Chapter 41, is that 1993 Ohio House Bill 107 contained an "employment intentional tort"
provision similar to that of 1995 Ohio House Bill 103, and was held unconstitutional for
violating the "one subject rule" contained in Ohio Const. art. II, § 15(D). However, this
reason is not supported since the Ohio Supreme Court only addressed the violation of
the "one subject rule," and not the substantive standard created for an "employment
intentional tort" in holding the provisions unconstitutional. Further, in House Bill 103,
the legislature remedied the "one subject rule" problems that the Court had stated in
House Bill 107. See State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO et al., v. Voinovich, Governor, et al., 631
N.E.2d 582 (Ohio 1994).
20 6 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2745.01(D)(2)-(4) (Anderson 1996).
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the employer must comply with workers' compensation laws. 207 For example,
there is no requirement that the employer must have a certain number of
employees and compulsorily pay into the compensation system for the
employer to be covered by the exclusive remedy provision. Again, if the
legislation was strictly a reaction to a workers' compensation problem, and
only applied to those types of injuries normally covered, why would the
legislature re-define the parties involved and not keep old definitions?
Third, and most significant, was the statement of legislative intent. The intent
of section 2745.01 was to overrule all the Ohio Supreme Court decisions
supporting the judicially created substantial certainty test for workplace
intentional torts, and to establish a specific intent requirement that applies to
all intentional injuries that occur in the workplace which are not compensable
under the workers' compensation system.208 As worded, all types of tort
actions not normally covered by the workers' compensation system between
an employer and employee might now be subject to a clear and convincing
standard, Rule 11-type sanctions, and the heightened evidence requirements
for a plaintiff responding to a motion for summary judgment or in other
pleadings.209
A crucial factor that is relevant, but not mentioned in section 2745.01, is that
section 2745.01 contains no indication as to what types of injuries resulting from
workplace torts are covered. Section 2745.01 contains no distinction, as is made
in the realm of workers' compensation excluding mental injuries caused by
mental stimuli from the exclusive remedy provisions.2 10 The only requirements
in 2745.01 are that there must be (1) an intentional act; (2) an employee; (3) an
employer; and (4) the employee must be employed.211
When these minimal requirements are read in conjunction with the
legislative intent requiring section 2745.01 to completely and solely control all
causes of action not governed by workers' compensation between employers
and employees, every injured employee will have extreme difficulty bringing
a common law cause of action against the employer. The requirements
207 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.01(A), (B), and (G) (Anderson 1996).
208 See supra note 4; 1995 H.B. 103 §3, eff. 11-1-95, reads:
The General Assembly hereby declares its intent in enacting...
2745.01 of the Revised Code to supersede the effect of the Ohio
Supreme Court decisions in Blankenship ... Jones... Van Fossen
... Pariseau ... and Fyffe... to the extent that the provisions of
... 2745.01 of the Revised Code are to completely and solely control all
causes of actions not governed by Section 35 of Article II, Ohio
Constitution, for physical or psychological conditions, or death, brought
by employees or the survivors of deceased employees against
employers. (emphasis added)(citations omitted).
Id.
209§ 2745.01 (B)-(C).
210 See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
211§ 2745.01(A)-(D).
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subjecting employees to a "clear and convincing" and deliberate intent standard
in all intentional tort actions will always apply.
Furthermore, the distinction the Ohio Supreme Court used in Blankenship
stating that intentional torts are outside the course of employment, and thus
not covered by the exclusive remedy provision of workers' compensation,
becomes irrelevant. The entire nature of this expansive interpretation is that by
overruling Blankenship and its successors, section 2745.01 becomes a
compliment, not a provision of, the worker's compensation scheme. The Ohio
workers' compensation system will compensate employees for all injuries that
are normally covered by the system, and Section 2745.01 will apply to all other
situations.
An employee's only possible bypass of this statute will be to argue that the
act did not occur in the course of employment. However, even this argument
is flawed. This is because both the reasoning in Blankenship was overruled, and
the definition of "employment intentional tort" does not specifically state that
the employer's intentional act even needs to be in the course of employment.
Section (A) states that an employer is not liable to respond in damages or at
common law for an intentional tort that occurs during the course of employment;
however, the next sentence states that the employer is only subject to liability
for an employment intentional tort.2 12 The definition of an employment
intentional tort does not mention that the act must occur in the course of
employment. This is a problem of statutory ambiguity that needs to be resolved
by the legislature. In the meantime, the consequences as a result of section
2745.01 will be extreme.
Query? Does section 2745.01 apply to a situation where an employee brings
a defamation action against an employer? Normally in a defamation action, a
plaintiff has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant made a false defamatory statement of fact regarding the plaintiff,
and that the defendant was "at least" negligent in publishing it.213 Under
section 2745.01, does a plaintiff employee now have to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant employer intentionally and
deliberately published the statement, and was not just "at least" negligent? If
this expansive interpretation of section 2745.01 is applied, the answer suggests
''yes."
Taking another situation, does an employee now have to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that an employer deliberately and intentionally injured
him in a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim? Or what about a
situation in which an employee alleges an invasion of the right of privacy and
212§ 2745.01(A).
213 Lansdowne v. Beacon Journal Publishing. Co., 512 N.E.2d 979, 982-84 (Ohio 1987).
The United States Supreme Court has held that in some circumstances, the First
Amendment requires the plaintiff to show the defamatory statement was made with
actual malice; see, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80, (1964).
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the employer moves for summary judgment quoting section 2745.01?214 Under
an expansive interpretation of section 2745.01, as long as the employer
committed the "act" during the course of employment, and the employee
cannot prove by a clear and convincing standard that the employer deliberately
and intentionally committed the act, the employee will not be able to recover
common law damages. In fact, if section 2745.01 is applied expansively, all
types of mental injuries caused by mental stimuli that occur in the course of
employment, between an employer and employee, which are not normally
covered by the Ohio's workers' compensation system, may be classified as an
intentional tort, and thus, subject an employee to this new standard. In all cases,
an employee would have to meet the heightened proof requirements and show
deliberate intent to have a common law cause of action.
This expansive application of section 2745.01 must be avoided. The purpose
of Article II, section 35 of the Ohio Constitution was to grant the Ohio General
Assembly the power to enact laws to create a balance between employers and
employees in the State of Ohio in regard to a system of insurance for employees
and work-related accidental injuries.2 15 The creation of an intentional tort
system solely for employers and employees interpreted outside the injuries
normally covered by workers' compensation, at this stage,216 exceeds those
granted powers. Article II, section 35 did not give the legislature the power to
create a sub-class of people and create standards and laws for those particular
people in situations outside the scheme of workers' compensation and the
injuries associated therein.
There are no legitimate reasons why the legislature would want to impose
different standards upon employees receiving mental-type injuries from those
applied to a person walking down the street just because of the
employer/employee relationship. An employee who is defamed by an
employer, has as much a right to a common law cause of action, as an actor
who is defamed by the National Enquirer. The employee should not be penalized
just because the act was committed during his employment and have to meet
a clear and convincing standard in all situations.
214 See, e.g., Housh v. Peth, 133 N.E.2d 340, syllabus (Ohio 1956)("An actionable
invasion of the right of privacy is the unwarranted appropriation or exploitation of one's
personality, the publicizing of one's private affairs with which the public has no
legitimate concern, or wrongful intrusion into one's private activities in such a manner
as to outrage or cause mental suffering, shame or humiliation to person of ordinary
sensibilities."). Id. at 341.
215 See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
2 16 1f the Ohio Legislature re-defines the term "injury" and includes mental injuries
caused by mental stimuli as compensable injuries, it may find constitutional support
under OHIO CONST. art. II, § 35 for including these injuries in an intentional tort
exception. Kerans, 575 N.E.2d at 430-31 (denying that exclusivity provision of Ohio
Workers' Compensation Act encompasses sexual harassment)("[w]e are not prepared
to assume that psychological disturbances arising solely from emotional stress in the
workplace fit within the definition of "injury" in R.C. 4123.01."). 575 N.E.2d at 430-31.
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It is also difficult to recognize any legitimate reasons why the legislature
would impose restrictions on employee attorney's in regard to heightened
pleading standards and possible sanctions, and not the same standard for all
attorneys and all causes of actions. The requirements in section 2745.01 interfere
with an employee's ability to obtain fair representation. Forseeably, not only
will employee attorneys deny to take cases unless there are flagrant deliberate
and intentional employer actions, but also employer attorneys will always
claim lack of good faith, and move for summary judgment requiring the clear
and convincing standard to be applied. In a sense, there is a built in deterrence
for employees to not file cases, and an incentive for employers to commit
undesirable actions without being subject to recourse.
VII. CONCLUSION
The proper interpretation of Ohio's Revised Code section 2745.01 should be
limited to the types of injuries normally associated with the Ohio workers'
compensation statute and only limited to that particular context. In the
workers' compensation context, section 2745.01 is a proper application of Ohio
legislative power. While the Ohio Supreme Court in Blankenship rightfully
established an exception to Ohio's exclusive remedy provision in workers'
compensation for cases involving intentional torts in the workplace, the
standard to be applied should not be the overly broad substantial certainty test
which includes recklessness; the proper standard should be the one determined
by the legislature in section 2745.01. That standard requires an employee to
prove deliberate and intentional conduct by the employer to proceed with a
common law intentional tort cause of action as an exception to Ohio workers'
compensation law.
However, further legislative reform is needed. The imposition of both the
clear and convincing standard and the heightened pleading hurdles upon
employees and their attorneys is extreme. The legislature had already
accomplished its goal of balancing the interests between employers and
employees without adding those provisions. These sections should be deleted,
and the intentional tort exception should be moved to Ohio Revised Code,
Chapter 41-Workers' Compensation.
Any expansive interpretation of section 2745.01 covering the types of
injuries, not traditionally associated with Ohio workers' compensation law and that
the legislature has either expressly or implicitly stated, is an abuse of power
that is not granted in Article II, section 35 of the Ohio Constitution. To create a
different standard for employees suffering from mental-type injuries caused
by non-physical stimuli, different than standards required of other people, does
not make sense and should not survive constitutional scrutiny. Ohio Revised
Code section 2745.01 should not be interpreted to shield employers from
liability in all cases when an employee cannot meet the heightened proof
standards. If this happens, it will only be a matter of time before all employers
will deny liability for conduct which they previously would have been held
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accountable, and will rely on section 2745.01 to force employees in all instances
to prove by "clear and convincing" evidence that they were "deliberately and
intentionally" injured.
MARC A. CLAYBON
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